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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RESEARCH-PLANNING, INC. 
vs. 
Plain tiff and 
appellant, 
Case No. 18968 
BANK OF UTAH, 
Defendant and 
respondent 
REPLY BRIEF FOR PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT 
A. 
THE BANK OF UTAH HAS NOT 
SHOWN ERROR IN RESEARCH-
PLANNING'S POSITION 
For clarity, we will examine the bank's arguments under the headings of 
ReseRSch-Planning's opening brief. 
A BANK DOES NOT HAVE 
TO ACT DISHONESTLY TO 
ACT IN BAD FAITH UNDER 
THE STATUTE 
A. The term "bad faith" as it is used in the Uniform Fiduciaries Act was 
intended to have the same meaning that the term had in the Uniform Negotiable 
Instruments Act:-The bank has not shown the error of this position. It has cited 
no authorities to the contrary. The principles of statutory construction cited by 
the bank have no application here. Research-Planning is not contending that the 
term ''bad faith" is ambiguous. Since the drafters of the Uniform Fiduciaries Act 
rejected the idea of defining the term "bad faith" (Opening brief, p. 12) and since 
"section 9 of the Uniform Fiduciaries Act lays down the same test of responsibility 
in this respect that section 56 of the Negotiable Instruments Law * * * does in 
regard to notice of an infirmity in a negotiable instrument or defect in the title of 
the person negotiating it," Davis v. Pennsylvania Company For Insurance On Lives, 
Etc., 12 A.2d 66, 68-69 (Pa. 1940), it only makes sense to give to the term in the 
context of this case the common meaning that it had under the earlier uniform 
Act. As we endeavored to show in our opening brief, (pp. 10-17), the term "bad 
faith" has had a common meaning in the law of negotiable instruments since at 
least the case of Goodman v. Simonds, 20 How. 343 (1857). 
B. It is bad faith for a bank to remain passive in the face of facts clearly 
suggesting fiduciary misconduct, particularly where the bank has a monetary inter-
est in the transaction:-The bank argues for a narrow interpretation of "bad faith" 
that would exclude all but dishonest conduct. "Dishonest" means a willful 
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1.ervPrsion of truth in order to deceive, cheat or defraud." Webster's Seventh New 
11 gi_A_!e_Q_ictionary (1967). With such a restricted interpretation of "bad faith" a 
1;0ui- <'ould be liable under the Uniform Fiduciaries Act only if it undertook to 
Jece1ve, cheat or defraud. None of the bank's authorities limits liability under the 
/\.ct so narrowly. No case that we have been able to find has held that a bank's 
avoidance of knowledge out of self-interest is not bad faith under the Act. Such 
an avoidance is willful and not mere negligence and, therefore, is well within the 
common meaning of the term "bad faith". The avoidance of knowledge out of 
self-interest has been the common thread running through nearly all of the judicial 
interpretations of "bad faith" since the decision in v. Simonds, 20 How. 
343 (1857). That thread runs through the cases involving negotiable instruments 
and through the cases under the Uniform Fiduciaries Act summarized in 
Trust Co. v. Western Sur. Co., 599 S.W. 2d 481, 492 (Mo. 1980). (Opening brief, 
pp. 12-17 .) 
This court's opinion in Sugarhouse Finance Co. v. Zions First National Bank, 
21 U.2d 68, 440 P.2d 869, 670 (1968) is not contrary to the common or settled 
meaning of "bad faith". That opinion recognizes that "bad faith" is defined not 
only as a thing done dishonestly but also as that which imparts "some motive of 
self-interest." Contrary to the bank's position (Br. 12), this court does not have to 
overrule prior Utah law to hold that a bank does not have to deceive, cheat or 
defraud to be liable for acting in bad faith under the statute. 
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II 
BANK ACTED IN BAD FAITH 
To avoid the issue of self-interest, the bank takes the position that it "had 
no pecuniary interest in the First Capital account" and that on August 19 and 20, 
when it paid checks drawn on that account, "it was not receiving any financial 
benefit." (Br. 27.) It is true that the bank was receiving no financial benefit in 
paying the checks. But the bank did give a financial benefit to its customer First 
Capital in paying the checks when the available balance in the account was not 
sufficient to cover the payments. Mr. Barth testified that the deposit of the 
$260,000 of fiduciary funds (opening brief, p. 4) was a "provisional" credit. As 
such, the deposit was not available for withdrawal as of right by First Capital. 
U.C.A. S 70A-4-213 (4). The provisional credit could have been withdrawn, as Mr. 
Barth testified. (Tr. 425-427 .) The bank has not contradicted Mr. Barth's testi-
mony or shown that U.C.A. S 70A-4-213 (4) does not apply on the facts of this 
case. 
The bank did have a pecuniary interest in the account-that of a creditor-
because of the overdrafts it created by paying the checks. It was the overdrafts 
that concerned Mr. Barth (bank's brief, p. 8; our opening brief, p. 8). It was the 
overdrafts that created the bank's self-interest. The bank took to itself a finan-
cial benefit when it chose to cover the overdrafts with the fiduciary funds rather 
than charge the overdraft to its customer First Capital. 
The bank has not contradicted any of the facts of this case as they are 
reviewed at pages 17-21 of our opening brief. Nor does the bank deny that all of 
the facts were in the knowledge of one of its officers. The bank does not deny 
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tl1at the further information in Mr. Alder's possession was available to the bank if 
,1, Harth had called Mr. Alder. The "means of knowledge" was "at hand", 
v. Simonds, 20 How. at 367, the reason to inquire existed and the means 
.i protecting all of the interested parties except the bank-by leaving the $260,000 
in provisional status, as Mr. Barth said could be done (Tr. 427, 428; opening brief, 
p. 20)-was available. The bank chose instead to shut its eyes and protect itself. 
B. 
U.C.A. SS 7-3-50 and 70A-3-603 
DO NOT APPLY TO THE FACTS 
OF THIS CASE 
The statutes on which the bank relies apply to those situations when a claim 
that is adverse to the bank's customer is made against funds on deposit or against 
commercial paper held by the bank. This case does not present such a situation. 
Mr. Alder asserted no right to the money in the First Capital account. His 
purpose was to "make sure that the money had been deposited • • • ." (See our 
opening brief, pp. 4-6). As the bank has conceded (Br. 35-36), the escrow 
agreement contemplated and required that the bank's customer First Capital hold 
the $260,000 of fiduciary funds. First Capital was entitled to the money subject 
only to its fiduciary obligation as an escrow agent. 
An "adverse claimant", within the meaning of the U.C.A. S 7-3-50, is one 
who says that funds in an account belong to him instead of to the one to whose 
credit they stand on the books of the bank. Baden Bank of St. Louis v. Trapp, 180 
S.W. 2d 755 (Mo. App. 1944) and the case cited by the bank, First National Bank 
v. Butler, 313 P.2d 421 (Ariz. 1957). Mr. Alder did not say that the 
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money belonged to him. A statement that money is held in escrow is not 8 
"claim" to the money. 
U.C.A. § 70A-3-603 deals with adverse claims to a negotiable instrument anc 
with the discharge of parties from "liability on an instrument". U.C.A. 
S 70A-3-601(1). No such issues are involved here. There is no claim "on an 
instrument" in this case. 
Since the statutes on which the bank relies deal with situations entirely 
different from the involvement of a bank in the handling of fiduciary funds, there 
is no conflict between those statutes and the Uniform Fiduciaries Act. The 
district court was correct in holding that the bank's statutes do not apply to the 
facts of this case. If there appeared to be a conflict between the Uniform 
Fiduciaries Act and the statutes in which the bank relies, the proper approach 
would be that set forth in Pride Club v. Miller, 572 P.2d 385 at 387 (Utah 1977): 
Even when [statutes] seem to overlap in some areas, they should 
be construed to give effect to both if possible; and the latter 
statute neither supersedes nor repeals the prior one unless its 
terms are irreconcilable with the former statute. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the judgment of the district court should be 
reversed and the case remanded for entry of judgment in favor of the plaintiff. 
BEESLEY, SPENCER&: FAIRCLOUGH 
Claron C. Spencer 
Keith W. Meade 
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